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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 18-1740 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
                    
v. 
 
ERIC JAMES STULL, 
Appellant 
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-16-cr-00125-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Donetta W. Ambrose 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 18, 2019 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ, and PORTER, Circuit Judges. 
  
(Filed:  January 22, 2019) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
  
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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Defendant Eric James Stull appeals his sentence for producing, distributing, and 
possessing child pornography.  Because the District Court’s sentence was procedurally 
and substantively reasonable, we will affirm.  
I 
Stull sexually assaulted his adopted daughter for a ten-year period beginning when 
she was less than two years old.  He created 106 photographs and thirty-nine videos of 
his assaults.  Stull was arrested by the Pennsylvania State Police and charged with Rape-
Less than 13 years of Age, Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse with a Child, 
Unlawful Contact with a Minor, and Corruption of Minors, all under Pennsylvania law.  
Stull was convicted and sentenced in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas to 340 to 
640 years’ imprisonment.  Stull was also charged in a federal indictment with thirty-nine 
counts of Production of Material Depicting the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2251(a), (e), one count of Distribution of Material Depicting the Sexual Exploitation of 
a Minor, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), and one count of Possession of Material Depicting the 
Sexual Exploitation of a Minor, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).  Stull pleaded guilty.   
The Presentence Report (“PSR”) calculated a total offense level of 43, which 
triggered a life sentence.  Because the Guidelines range exceeds the highest statutory 
maximum sentence for any count of conviction, the PSR stated that the range would have 
to be adjusted pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d).  Stull did not object to the PSR 
calculation, but at sentencing he sought a 240-month sentence.  The Government 
requested a sentence commensurate with the 340-year state sentence to “ensure that this 
defendant never sees the light of day.”  App. 179-80.  The District Court considered these 
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requests as well as statements from Stull, his sons, and his wife.  Thereafter, the Court 
stated that this was “an entirely heinous crime . . . the worst of these types of cases that [it 
has] seen,” App. 200, and recognized Stull’s personal history, including his experience 
with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) from his military service, the state court 
sentence, the goal of deterring him from future similar conduct, the need to protect the 
public and his family, and the need for just punishment. 
The District Court adopted the PSR’s offense level calculation and sentenced Stull 
to a total of 338 years, one month, and eleven days’ imprisonment.  “This term 
consist[ed] of 20 years imprisonment at each of Counts 1-17 to be served consecutively; 
15 years at each of Counts 18-39 and 20 years at each of Counts 40-41 to be served 
concurrently to each other and to Counts 1-17.”  App. 3.  The sentence was ordered to run 
concurrent with Stull’s state sentence.  Stull was also sentenced to a term of supervised 
release of life on all counts to run concurrently.  After the sentence was imposed, Stull 
questioned its procedural reasonableness, challenging the Court’s “reliance on [the] 
nature and circumstances of the offense as a foremost factor.”  App. 216.  In response, the 
Court noted “I think I referred to all of them.”  Id.  Stull appeals.   
II1 
 Before the District Court, Stull argued that his sentence was procedurally 
unreasonable because the Court put undue weight on the nature of his offense.  On 
appeal, he makes additional arguments of procedural unreasonableness and claims that 
                                              
1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
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his sentence is substantively unreasonable because it amounts to a sentence greater than 
that often imposed for murder.   
For arguments that were not raised before the District Court, we review for plain 
error.2  United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc).  For 
arguments that were raised, we review for abuse of discretion.  See United States v. 
Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  The party challenging the sentence 
bears the burden of demonstrating procedural and substantive unreasonableness.  Id.  We 
will first review Stull’s arguments concerning procedural unreasonableness.  
A 
In reviewing the procedural reasonableness of a district court’s sentence, we focus 
on whether the district court: (1) calculated the applicable Guidelines range, 
(2) considered any departure motions, and (3) meaningfully considered all relevant 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including any variance requests.  United States v. Merced, 603 
F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2010).  “[A]bsent any significant procedural error, we must ‘give 
due deference to the district court’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole,’ 
justify the sentence.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 
38, 51 (2007)).   
                                              
2 To establish plain error, a litigant must demonstrate: (1) an error; (2) that is clear 
or obvious; and (3) that affects the litigant’s substantial rights.  Virgin Islands v. Mills, 
821 F.3d 448, 456 (3d Cir. 2016).  If all three prongs are satisfied, our Court has 
discretion to remedy the error “only if . . . the error ‘seriously affects the fairness, 
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’”  Id. at 457 (quoting Johnson v. 
United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997)).    
  
5 
 
Stull’s first argument, the only claim that he preserved, is that the District Court 
misapplied the § 3553(a) factors at the third step of the sentencing procedure.  See 
Merced, 603 F.3d at 215.  He argues that the Court failed to make an appropriate 
individualized assessment under the § 3553(a) factors by placing improper weight on the 
nature of his offense.  Stull’s argument fails.  While the Court emphasized the “heinous” 
nature of his crimes “first and foremost,” App. 200, the Court also discussed other 
§ 3553(a) factors, including Stull’s personal history and PTSD, deterrence, public 
protection, and just punishment.  Thus, the Court considered his offense conduct over a 
ten-year period and other § 3553(a) factors.3 
Stull’s other procedural arguments that (1) the District Court’s sentence violated 
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d), (2) the Court failed to explain why Stull’s proposed 240-month 
sentence was insufficient, and (3) the Court ceded to the Government’s desire for 
insurance on the state sentence, were not preserved and are therefore subject to plain 
error review.  As explained below, the Court committed no errors.  
First, the District Court did not err in issuing consecutive sentences amounting to 
338 years.  The Guidelines provide that 
                                              
3 Indeed, Stull admits that the District Court “mention[ed] all the applicable 
factors.”  Def.’s Br. at 21 (quoting App. 216).  So Stull takes issue not with whether the 
Court considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors, but with how the Court weighed those 
factors.  We have characterized such an argument as a challenge to the substantive 
reasonableness of the sentence imposed.  See United States v. Fountain, 792 F.3d 310, 
323 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Fountain’s argument ultimately amounts to a challenge of 
substantive unreasonableness, as a complaint that a district court’s choice of sentence did 
not afford certain factors enough weight ‘is a substantive complaint, not a procedural 
one.’” (quoting Merced, 603 F.3d at 217)).  For the reasons set forth herein, this 
challenge lacks merit. 
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[i]f the sentence imposed on the count carrying the highest statutory 
maximum is less than the total punishment, then the sentence imposed on 
one or more of the other counts shall run consecutively, but only to the extent 
necessary to produce a combined sentence equal to the total punishment.  In 
all other respects, sentences on all counts shall run concurrently, except to 
the extent otherwise required by law. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d).  “The ‘total punishment’ is determined by the adjusted combined 
offense level.”  United States v. Chorin, 322 F.3d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding 
defendant with offense level sentence of 360 months was properly sentenced to 
consecutive sentences of 240 and 120 months).  Here, Stull’s total offense level was 43 
and the Guidelines custodial range was life, but none of the offenses carried a life term.  
As a result, the Court followed the Guidelines directive by issuing a combination of 
consecutive and concurrent maximum sentences to reach the type of sentence that the 
Guidelines contemplated.  See United States v. Lewis, 594 F.3d 1270, 1275-76 (10th Cir. 
2010) (holding no error in issuing consecutive maximum sentence for each crime of 
conviction to arrive at a sentence of 330 years where proper Guidelines’ sentence was 
life but no offense carried a life sentence); id. at 1275 (“[W]e fail to see how [the 
defendant] can complain of being sentenced to any term of years—after all, as a practical 
matter the longest that he can be incarcerated is for the rest of his life.”) 
Second, the District Court did not err in not explicitly addressing Stull’s request 
for a 240-month sentence.  It did so, however, by implication.  The Court explained why 
the sentence it selected was necessary.  Moreover, because the Guidelines prescribed a 
life sentence and the maximum statutory sentences Stull faced exceeded 300 years, a 
request for a 240-month sentence, predicated on a generalized estimate of Stull’s life 
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expectancy represents a sentence of less than seven percent of the maximum sentence 
under § 5G1.2(d) of the Guidelines, and, as the Court explained, a greater sentence was 
needed to punish Stull and protect the public. 
Third, Stull’s contention that the District Court ceded to the prosecutor’s request 
to ensure that he serve the sentence the state imposed is without merit.  The Court 
acknowledged that the federal and state sentences were parallel but that it could not count 
on the federal sentence being unnecessary.  More significantly, however, the Court’s 
analysis did not rest on the prosecutor’s request but instead demonstrated thoughtful 
consideration of Stull’s crimes and other § 3553(a) factors.   
For these reasons, Stull’s sentence is procedurally reasonable.  
B 
Having concluded that the sentence “is procedurally sound, we will affirm it 
unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that 
particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.  
Stull argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because it amounts to 
more than his actual life, and it is greater than the sentence imposed on many murderers.   
A sentence that exceeds Stull’s life expectancy is not, by itself, substantively 
unreasonable.  United States v. Ward, 732 F.3d 175, 186 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The fact that 
[the defendant] may die in prison does not mean that his sentence is unreasonable.”).  
Furthermore, a sentence of this magnitude for this type of offense is not unprecedented.  
See United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 574 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming ninety-year 
sentence for fifty year old defendant who helped run a network that allowed for the 
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trading of hundreds of thousands of images of child pornography); United States v. 
Betcher, 534 F.3d 820, 827-28 (8th Cir. 2008) (affirming a 750-year sentence for child 
pornography, which “for practical purposes—is a life sentence”); United States v. 
Johnson, 451 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (affirming 140-year sentence 
for child pornography conviction as a reasonable sentence within the Guidelines range of 
life, despite the defendant’s request for a 30-year sentence).   
Finally, the District Court’s “weighing and consideration” of the § 3553(a) factors 
“is exactly the type of ‘reasoned appraisal’ to which we defer on review.”  United States 
v. Styer, 573 F.3d 151, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 
85, 111 (2007)); United States v. Reibel, 688 F.3d 868, 872 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that 
“sentencing judges have discretion over how much weight to give a particular factor” and 
that “[a]lthough the weighting must fall within the bounds of reason, those bounds are 
wide” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the repeated and extreme 
nature of Stull’s offenses, its impact on the victim and other family members, and the 
presence of few mitigating factors, we cannot say that no reasonable sentencing court 
would have imposed the same sentence on Stull.   
III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
